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Judicial Review of Direct Democracy:
A Reappraisal
Michael E. Solimined
In his dissent in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission in 2015, Justice Clarence
Thomas argued that the Supreme Court had been inconsistent in
the rigor it employs when considering constitutional challenges
to the products of direct democracy, i.e., referenda and initiatives.
Some cases seemed to use stricter scrutiny, and others lesser
scrutiny, as compared to challenges to ordinary legislation. Justice
Thomas argued that the review of direct democracy should be the
same as for ordinary legislation, a proposition with which this
Article agrees. This Article challenges the position advanced by
ProfessorJuLan Eule over twenty-five years ago, and others since
then, that the process and products of direct democracy are
suspicious enough to warrant stricter judicial scrutiny. In
contrast, this Article contends that, on the whole, direct
democracy is suficiently similar to ordinary legislation, and not
particularly invasive of minority rghts, such that no special
judicial hostility is warranted.
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court often decides its most momentous and
controversial cases at the end of a Term,' and the 2014-15 Term was no exception.
This term included decisions involving same-sex marriage, the Affordable Care
Act, and the use of independent commissions to redraw congressional districts,
bypassing legislatures.3 Lost among the heated commentary was a reflection on
1 Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. An earlier version of
this Article was presented at a symposium on election law at the University of Kentucky College of Law
on March 25, 2016, sponsored by the Kentucky LawJournal. Thanks to Michael Dimino, Rick Hasen,
Rich Saphire, Michael Gilbert, Dan Tokaji, and Jim Walker for helpful comments on an earlier draft,
and Ashley Mullikin for her excellent research assistance. © 2016 by Michael E. Solimine.
2 Lee Epstein, et al., The Best for Last: The Timing of US. Supreme Court Decisions, 64 DUKE L.J.
991, 1021 (2015).
' See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607-08 (2015) (finding a constitutional right to same-sex
marriage); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489-90 (2015) (holding that Affordable Care Act
authorizes creation of federal exchanges); Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n,
135 S. Ct. 2652, 2677 (2015) (holding that independent redistricting commission, created by ballot
initiative and bypassing state legislature, could constitutionally redraw congressional districts consistent
with the Elections Clause).
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direct democracy4 by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissenting in the Court's decision in
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission.5
Justice Thomas argued that in the last days of the Term, the Court had not been
consistent in its level of judicial review of the products of direct democracy.' In the
redistricting case, he contended, the Court offered "a paean to the ballot initiative"7
while only days earlier it had "cast aside state laws across the country-many of
which were enacted through ballot initiative" in the same-sex marriage case.8
Justice Thomas gave still other examples of what he characterized as the "Court's
lack of respect for ballot initiatives,"9 and argued that the redistricting decision
challenged in this particular case was "unusually democracy-reducing," since it took
"districting away from the people's representatives and [gave] it to an unelected
committee.""° Rather than being deferential to or disrespectful of such initiatives,
Justice Thomas stated that he "would instead treat the States in an evenhanded
manner. That means applying the Constitution as written."11 By this, he apparently
meant that he would apply the same judicial scrutiny to all products of state
lawmaking, whether from the legislature or from the results of direct democracy.
Justice Thomas's revisiting of the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny for ballot
initiatives provides an opportunity to reexamine the issue. The issue was well
framed in a leading article, twenty-six years ago, by the late Professor Julian N.
Eule:
If the people are the sovereign from which all power originates, then why should
their expression of will not carry more weight than the legislature's crude effort to
approximate it? If the root difficulty of judicial review is its counter-majoritarian
nature, why does the argument for judicial intervention not abate as it becomes
dearer what the majority prefers? 2
4 See infra Part IA. for further discussion of what measures are covered by this term.
s Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm ', 135 S. Ct. at 2697-99 (Thomas, J., dissenting).6!Id.
I Id. at 2697.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 2698. Justice Thomas cited numerous examples from the 2014-2015 Term in which the Court
denied certiorari or motions for stays from lower federal court decisions finding state laws passed by
ballot initiative to be unconstitutional. Id. He also mentioned the sharp criticisms of ballot initiatives in
a dissenting opinion from the previous term, which had upheld an initiative against a constitutional
challenge. Id., see also Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant
Rights & Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1651 (2014)
[hereinafter Schuette v. BAMN] (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
10 Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comrnm'n, 135 S. Ct. at 2698 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas
caustically added that the "Court's characterization of this as direct democracy at its best is rather like
praising a plebiscite in a 'banana republic' that installs a strongman as President for Life." Id. at 2698-
99.
n Id. at 2699.
12 Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE LJ. 1503, 1506 (1990) (footnotes
omitted).
Judicial Review of Direct Democracy
Scholarly debate on the appropriate level of scrutiny stretches back to the
1970s,13 but no academic consensus has emerged. Moreover, the results of the most
recent term and Justice Thomas's focus on the issue illustrate that the Supreme
Court also lacks a consistent view of the appropriate level of scrutiny. The
American appetite for the continued use of direct democracy appears to be
unabated, and this same appetite has increased in other parts of the world. 4 There
is little doubt that the Court (and lower courts) will continue to confront the
doctrinal choices highlighted by Justice Thomas in his Arizona dissent.
Part I of the Article sets out the uncertain status quo in the Supreme Court
regarding what level of deference (if any) the Court has variously given to
constitutional challenges to state laws that are the product of direct democracy. It
first reviews Supreme Court opinions that have addressed the issue prior to Justice
Thomas in 2015, and shows a variety of views, and often no expressed view at all.
The Article then turns to the academic literature and sets out differing views that
have been expressed in that literature. Part II of the Article revisits the issue of
scrutiny in light of more recent developments, and concludes that Justice Thomas is
correct. This conclusion is justified on the basis that the process of direct
democracy appearing on the ballot and being voted on does not, in ways important
to judicial scrutiny, fundamentally differ from the process of legislative lawmaking;
that similarly the products of direct democracy are not, on the whole, different
from that of the legislative branch; and that proposals for a harder look judicial
review of the result of direct democracy suffer from significant problems of
13 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 557-59 (4th ed. 2007) (citing literature from
1970s to the present); Note, Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2748,
2750-66 (2005) (reviewing scholarly literature on the subject).
14 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 13, at 525 ("The 1990s saw the most initiatives on the ballot, with
more than 375 proposed, and the first decade of the 21st Century appears to be on track to match or
exceed that figure."); John Dinan, State Constitutional Initiative Processes and Governance in the
Twenty-First Century, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 61, 63-67 (2016) (detailing 203 citizen-initiatedamendments to state constitutions in 2000-2014); Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy: Lessons om
the United States, POL. INSIGHT, Dec. 2014, at 26, 26-27 (pointing out that "[b]etween 2000 and
2012 Americans voted on nearly 1600 statewide referendums and initiatives" and discussing the use of
such devices in Europe); see also REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: THE CONTINUED GROWTH
OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 11 (Matt Qyortrup ed., 2014) (noting that the use of referendums are
"growing" and analyzing all the nationwide referendums covering all continents); Steven Erlanger,
Dutch Referendum Could Cause Trouble for European Union, N.Y. TIMES (April 6, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/world/europe/dutch-referendum -could-cause-trouble-for-
europe.html?_r=0 ("A trend toward more 'popular democracy' is visible in Europe .... ").
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definition and application. I will then conclude the Artide with some final
thoughts. 15
I. THE STATUS Quo: SUPREME COURTJURISPRUDENCE AND ACADEMIC
CRITIQUES
A. Direct Democracy in America: A Brief Overiew
"Direct democracy" is a shorthand for a variety of tools whereby voters can
bypass the legislature and enact legislation or amend state constitutions. The two
principal methods are the initiative and the referendum. 16 Through the direct
initiative, a certain percentage of the electorate may place a proposal on the ballot
to enact a law or amend the state constitution.1 7 Through the indirect initiative, the
proposal is submitted to the legislature for action, and it is subsequently placed on
the ballot if the legislature fails to pass the proposal or enacts a different one.18 In
contrast, the referendum permits the electorate to pass on a law proposed by or
already enacted by the legislature. 9 The referendum may be placed directly on the
ballot by the collection of a requisite number of signatures, or by the legislature
itself.2 °
The tools of direct democracy have deep and contested roots in American
political history. At the Constitutional Convention, the framers rejected such tools
in favor of representative government, but direct democracy devices appeared in
state constitutions throughout the nineteenth century. 2' The widespread adoption
of direct democracy occurred around the turn of the last century, especially in the
Western states. 2' The primary proponents of this change were Populists and
Progressives, seeking to bypass legislatures which, they argued, had been captured
" There are several matters I will not be directly addressing. I am not concerned with the merits, or lack
thereof, of direct democracy itself, but only of the scope of federal judicial review of constitutional
attacks on initiatives and referenda. The Supreme Court has long, if controversially, held that arguments
that direct democracy itself is incompatible with the Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable. See Pac.
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 150-51 (1912). 1 am not revisiting that, either. My
primary focus will be on judicial review of state-wide initiatives and referenda, and not direct democracy
at the local level regarding taxes, recalls, and other issues, which raise issues beyond the scope of this
Article. Finally, my primary focus will be on the proper stance of federal courts hearing challenges under
federal law, not on state courts hearing challenges under state law.
16 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 13, at 523-34.
11 Id. at 523.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 523-24.
20 Id. For further details on the various types of initiative and referenda, see id. See also Eule, supra note
12, at 1510-13.
21 Direct Democracy Origin of the Species, ECONOMIST (Apr. 20, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/18548119.
2 KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 37-39 (2009).
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by business interests. ' The result of efforts in the Progressive Era (and by
adoptions in a few more states in later decades) is that twenty-four states now
provide for some form of the initiative, and twenty-four states provide for some
form of the referendum. 24
After the wave of many adoptions by the end of the Progressive Era, the
numbers of initiatives and referendums submitted to voters, and the rate of
approval, has waned and waxed. In most states, the devices were only infrequently
used in the middle part of the 20th century.' Given the diverse political cultures
among the states, generalizations must be made cautiously, but most observers
attribute the decline to voters losing interest in the devices and to increased
professionalism and activity by legislatures.26 Resurgence started in the 1970s in
many states and continues unabated to the present.27 This is often attributed to the
success of Proposition 13 in California in 1978 limiting property taxes; the
initiative has been frequently used in California itself since then.28 Western states
accounted for most of the initial adopters of direct democracy, and they still
dominate the numbers of voter adopted initiative and referenda. 29
23 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 13, at 523. For a history of the initial rejection and later adoption
of direct democracy in the United States, up to the dose of the Progressive Era, see MILLER, supra note
22, at 37-39. For an "alternative story" to the prevailing view that direct democracy is the outgrowth of
Populist impulses, see Eule, supra note 12, at 1512-13 n.38 ("There is evidence that expansion of direct
democracy often was designed more as a political tactic to secure immediate victory against the existing
political machine than as an alternative system of sustained decision-making.").24 MILLER, supra note 22, at 35. The total number of states with at least one such device is twenty-
seven. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 13, at 524 (indicating that twenty-seven states have one or both
devices); see also MILLER, supra note 22, at 35 n.70 (pointing out that six states have one but not both).
Some sources report different numbers than those just mentioned. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 12, at
1509-10 ("Thirty-six states provide for statewide statutory referenda in some form ...."). The
difference appears to be due to different writers using different criteria to determine what counts as an
initiative or referendum. For example, every state but Delaware requires approval of the electorate to
amend state constitutions, and some states require various issues to be submitted to the voters for
approval. See id. at 1510 & n.23. For further discussion of the definitional complexities, see id. at 1510-
12. Ascertaining precise numbers or definitions is not necessary for the issues addressed in this Article.
In the balance of the Article, I will usually use the terms initiative, referendum, ballot measures,
plebiscites, and products of direct democracy in a more-or-less interchangeable way. Also, like Professor
Eule, I do not differentiate between ballot measures that are enacted as statutes, as opposed to those that
amend state constitutions. See id. at 1511 n.28. While that distinction can be important for
interpretative and other reasons, it does not bear greatly on whether federal courts should engage in hard
look review.
25 MILLER, supra note 22, at 44-45.
26 See id. at 41-46 (discussing the 1910s through the 1960s era); see also Robert D. Cooter & Michael
D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687,
694-97 (2010) (summarizing increase in use of initiatives and referenda in 20th and 21st centuries).27 MILLER, supra note 22, at 47.
2 1 Id. at 46-50.
291 d. at 50-55 (detailing that California, Oregon, Washington, Colorado, and Arizona account for the
highest number of initiatives in recent decades).
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B. Supreme Court Review ofDirect Democracy
A quarter century ago, Professor Eule ably documented that the United States
Supreme Court had, in nearly three-dozen cases, considered constitutional
challenges to state laws that were the products of direct democracy.3 ° Despite the
seemingly obvious impact of direct democracy on the counter-majoritarian
difficulty, 3' Eule pointed out that these decisions had "scarcely a word on the
subject."32 What little discussion there was consisted almost entirely of, in Eule's
words, "boilerplate statement[s]" 3  that the source of the legislation was irrelevant,
because both legislatures and voters themselves can take actions that violate the
Constitution. 34 The decisions Eule surveyed by Justice Hugo Black provided a
counterargument to Eule's fmding15 In several cases, Justice Black, both writing for
majorities and in dissent, emphasized the "democratic" origins of the state laws
under challenge and seemed to imply that judicial review should be diluted in light
of that fact.36 Both lines of argument can charitably be described as undertheorized.
There has not been much change in the twenty-six years since Eule wrote. The
Court, during this time, has rendered about eleven decisions reaching the merits of
o Eule, supra note 12, at 1505 & n.5 (listing decisions from 1912 to 1986).
31 Seeid. at 1506.
32 See id. at 1505.
33 Id.
34 See id. at 1505-06, 1506 n.6 (citing, among other cases, Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair
Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981) and Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of
Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 737 (1964)).
35 Id. at 1506 n.11.
36 See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971) (stating that referenda show a "devotion to
democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice"); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.,385, 397 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting). Cf. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial
Equahty, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3-7 (1978) (arguing that Justice Black's opinions in James and Hunter
did not even amount to rational basis review, much less any higher scrutiny).
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constitutional challenges to state initiatives or referenda. 37 As before, most of these
cases are silent on the issue of any extraordinary deference, or lack thereof, from the
Court given the source of the laws. And what little discussion there is can be fairly
described as being of the boilerplate nature. For example, in U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, a majority of the Court held that a state initiative establishing
term limits for members of Congress was invalid by adding requirements for office
beyond that found in the Constitution. 38 Justice Thomas, in a dissent joined by
31 See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) (upholding
an initiative establishing a redistricting commission); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
(striking down initiatives invalidating same-sex marriage); Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014)
(upholding an initiative restricting affirmative action in higher education); Ariz. Free Enter. Club's
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011) (striking down an initiative establishing a public
campaign finance system); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008)
(upholding initiative regulating various aspects of primary elections); Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n,
551 U.S. 177 (2007) (upholding initiative on agency fees for unions); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11
(2003) (upholding initiative on three strikes in criminal sentencing); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510
(2001) (striking down initiative instructing members of Congress to support term limits); Cal.
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (striking down initiative establishing blanket primary);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down referendum limiting gay rights); U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (striking down initiative establishing term limits for
congressional candidates in the state). The Court, during this time, also decided several cases where the
state law at issue was the product of direct democracy, but either the merits of a constitutional challenge
were not reached or were not directly at issue. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)
(dismissing case on standing grounds); Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010) (discussing disclosure of
referenda petitions); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (discussing whether federal statute
preempted state initiative); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (discussing constitutionality of federal
statute preempting state law); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999)
(discussing ballot-initiative process); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997)
(dismissing case as moot). The Court does not always dearly indicate that the state law it is reviewing is
the product of direct democracy. For example, even though almost all of the laws barring same-sex
marriage at issue in the consolidated cases in Obergefellwere the result of ballot measures (and the same
can be said of the rest of the laws from other states not directly before the Court in that case), the
majority opinion makes only the briefest mention of this fact. See ObergefeI1, 135 S. Ct. at 2597, 2605.
For more information on the laws at issue in Obergefe/, see Elena Baylis, Doclining Controversial
Cases: How Marriage Equahty Changed the Parahgm, 2015 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLY
QUORUM 110, 128-29, http://www.nyujlpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Baylis-2015-nyujlpp-
ll0.pdf (noting that thirty-one of the anti-same sex marriage laws were enacted via initiative or
referenda). This fact is also briefly mentioned by two of the dissents. Id. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
id. at 2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting). None of the opinions expressly address the issue of whether the
source of these laws should impact judicial scrutiny. Two briefs filed in the case discussed the scope of
judicial review of direct democracy. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 22, Obergefel, 135 S. Ct. at 2584
(14-562), 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1492 ("Nor can deference to the democratic process shield the
Non-Recognition Laws from judicial review."); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Family Ass'n-
Michigan in Support of Respondents at 13, 19-20, Obergefel, 135 S. Ct. at 2584 (No. 14-571), 2015
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1344 (arguing against "[s]triking down this sovereign expression of the will of
the People of the State of Michigan").
38 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995). Similar to the circumstances in
Obergefell, the Court in Term Limits considered the term limit provision of only one state, but no less
than twenty-three states in the 1990s had adopted such provisions, all but one by initiative. MILLER,
supra note 22, at 161-66.
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three other Justices, observed that the majority, as he saw it, overruled the right of
the people to choose whom they wanted by invalidating an initiative that carried
with over sixty percent of the vote.39 The implication, it seemed, was that the Court
should take this into account, presumably by way of some special deference in its
scrutiny." In response, the majority stated that the source of the state law was
immaterial: no party, it said, had argued that "the constitutionality of a state law
would depend on the method of its adoption" and "[tihe people [of a state] have no
more power than does the" legislature to undertake unconstitutional actions.4 1
Another recent example of a relatively brief discussion was in Schuette v.
BAMN, where a majority of the Court upheld an amendment to the Michigan
constitution passed by initiative that prohibited affirmative action efforts by state
schools.4 2 All of the opinions, to varying degrees, discussed the source of the law,
but only indirectly addressed whether the level of scrutiny should be modulated.43
The plurality opinion, by Justice Kennedy, spent considerable time distinguishing
precedent that seemed to stand for the proposition that direct democracy could not
be used if it made it more difficult for racial minorities to use the ordinary
legislative process to achieve their goals.' The plurality opinion then cautioned
against reading these "political-process doctrine" cases too broadly, lest they be
considered as creating impermissible racial categorization of their own, and because
they could apply to a seemingly endless series of governmental policies.4" In the
present case, the plurality observed that "Michigan voters used the initiative system
to bypass public officials who were deemed not responsive to the concerns of a
majority of the voters,"' and that it was improper to assume that the issue
39 U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He added that similar initiatives had
been adopted in over twenty other states and praised the purpose of the initiatives, since members of
state legislatures, who enjoyed high reelection rates, would be unlikely to voluntarily adopt them. Id. at
917 n.39, 922-23.
40 An alternative explanation of Justice Thomas's references to the source of the laws was that it was
relevant to the merits of the case. He argued that states were free to enact term limits for members of
Congress from a state because, among other things, initiatives were an example of "We the People"
acting, when the balance of the Constitution was silent on the issue. Seeid. at 846-49, 846 n.1.
41 Id. at 822 n.32 (majority opinion).
42 BAMN, 134 S. Ct. at 1636-37 (plurality opinion).
4' Only one of the briefs filed in the case appears to have directly addressed the issue. See Brief of the
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights and the Leadership Fund et al., as Amid Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 6-7, 11, BAMN, 134 S. Ct. at 1623 (No. 12-682), 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 3623 ("[Hleightened judicial scrutiny under the political restructuring doctrine is particularly
appropriate for race-focused constitutional amendments passed by ballot initiative.").
44 BAMAN, 134 S. Ct. at 1631-36 (plurality opinion) (discussing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S.
457 (1982)).
45 Seeid. at 1626, 1634-35.
46 Id. at 1636.
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presented in the initiative was "too sensitive or complex to be within the grasp of
the electorate."'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, argued that
the "political-process doctrine" cases should be overruled entirely." He argued that
the doctrine is undermined in this case since the initiative process was itself "one
(perhaps the most basic one) of the rules of the State's political process."49 Justice
Scalia engaged in a running debate with dissenting Justice Sotomayor (joined by
Justice Ginsburg), who embraced the political-process doctrine."0 In the course of a
lengthy dissent, Justice Sotomayor seemed to unfavorably compare the use of direct
democracy by minority groups to the ordinary legislative process."' She noted at
one point the sometimes onerous and expensive signature requirements to place
initiatives on the ballot.5 2
Despite the frequent references to direct democracy, none of the opinions in
Schuette directly argued that judicial review of direct democracy should be different
from ordinary legislation. On the other hand, the opinions did directly engage the
political-process doctrine, and that doctrine did seem to add some extra burden of
justification (albeit in the arguably limited circumstances of those cases) when the
products of direct democracy were challenged under the Equal Protection Clause.13
Most recently, consider the Court's discussion in Arizona State Legislature v.
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. The primary issue in that case
was whether an initiative could establish a commission, independent of the
legislature, to redraw Congressional district lines, consistent with the Elections
Clause of the Constitution.54 The majority, in holding that there was consistency,
did not explicitly address the level of review issue raised by Justice Thomas's
dissent."5 But it did describe direct democracy in ways that might shed light on that
issue. The majority observed that a "characteristic of our federal system [is] that
States retain autonomy to establish their own governmental processes." 6 It also
invoked the familiar metaphor of the states as "laboratories for experimentation,"17
17 Id. at 1637.
" Id. at 1640 (Scalia, J., concurring).4 91 Id. at 1647.
50 Id. at 1653-54, 1671-76 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 1667-70.
52 Id. at 1661.
53 Id. at 1634-36; id. at 1643-48 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1648, 1650 (Breyer, J. concurring); id. at
1651, 1667-70 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
14 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658-59 (2015). The
Elections Clause says in part that the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof." U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 4, d.
1. The Court also addressed whether the Arizona legislature had standing to bring the suit in federal
court. Aiiz Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. at 2663-66.
SId. at 2697-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 2673.
51 Id. at 2673 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995).
2015-2016]
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and added that "[d]eference to state lawmaking 'allows local policies more sensitive
to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society,"' and permits greater "innovation"
and responsiveness by the States."8 There are hints of a more deferential attitude
toward judicial review of initiative, an attitude not lost on Justice Thomas, as
already noted. What Justice Thomas did not mention is that he also had previously
suggested a deferential attitude towards direct democracy in his dissent in US.
Term Limits.5 9
C. Academic Critiques
Most of the academic literature has called for courts to take a "hard look" at the
products of direct democracy when they are subject to constitutional challenge.'
Most of these critiques are premised on the perceived inadequacies of the process of
enacting law through referenda and initiative as compared to that in the state
legislative process. 6 1 As I have already indicated, the most trenchant proponent of
this position was Julian Eule. Professor Eule acknowledged that his critique was
premised on the political process theory, most popularly associated with the
Supreme Court's decision in Carolene Products, and the work of Professor John
Hart Ely.62 The Court in Carolene Products famously stated in dicta that "more
exacting judicial scrutiny" was appropriate when legislation was the result of"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities," or when legislation "restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation."63 In a similar vein, Professor Ely argued that "unblocking
stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial review ought preeminently to
be about."64 Ely identified process defects or malfunctions as when "(1) the ins are
choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the
s'Id. (quoting Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211,221 (2011)).
59 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).6 MILLER, supra note 22, at 91-93; Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public
Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 707, 709-10, 710 n.5 (1991). For more recent critiques
similar to Eule's and arguments for a hard look approach, see, for example, Elise Hofer, The Case for
Judicial Revicw of Direct Democracy, 4 J.L. 49, 50-51 (2014); Judicial Approaches to Direct
Democracy, supra note 13, at 2766-69.
61 Eule, supra note 12, at 1524.
62 See Eule, supra note 12, at 1524-26. To be sure, the political process doctrine addressed above draws
on, but is not the same as, the political process theoryoutlined here. It has been argued that the theory
does not map directly onto the doctrine; because direct democracy might be a way for dispersed
majorities to exercise political clout, as compared to that exercised in the political process by heretofore
marginalized minorities or other interest groups. See David E. Bernstein, "Reverse Carolene Products,"
the End of the Second Reconstruction, and Other Thoughts on Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 261, 276-77,
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/supreme-court-review/2014/9/bernstein.pdf.
' United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
14 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OFJUDICiAL REVIEW 117 (1980).
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outs will stay out, or (2) . . . representatives beholden to an effective majority are
systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility."6"
Eule argued that direct democracy does a poor job of reflecting majority will for
a variety of reasons, and thus did not solve the counter-majoritarian difficulty. He
pointed out that elections for direct democracy are almost always characterized by
considerable voter roll-off (i.e., voters not casting a ballot for a measure, even while
voting for everything else on a ballot), ballot measures of such complexity and
length that they are difficult to understand, and sometimes simultaneous ballot
measures that compete with each other.66 Aside from these problems in the ballot
box, direct democracy lacks the deliberation and filtering of majority will that is
presumably characteristic of many or most decision making in the legislative
branch.67 It is also often said that direct democracy, as a raw tool of the majority, is
especially prone to limit minority rights. Eule observed that while the legislature
may not always protect minority rights, direct democracy almost certainly wil not,
as it is in fact "supposed' to reflect the "[n]aked preferences" of the majority; it is
not the result of "system breakdown" in the political system because it is outside the
system of minority protection.68 He argued that making a comparison between the
legislative versus ballot record on minority rights was a difficult one, because, he
felt, the task was a subjective one given the difficulties of defiming "minorities" and
6 Id. at 103. Given the prominence of political process theory in general and of Ely's exposition of it in
particular in constitutional theory, it will be my focus as well. See Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Arizona
and Anti-Reform, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 477, 488 [hereinafter Stephanopoulos, Arizona and And-
Reform]; David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 1259 n.4. Elys
positions on the issues addressed in this Article are less clear. In his famed book, Democracy and
Distrust, he makes only passing reference to the products of direct democracy. See genera//y ELY, supra
note 64, at 138-180 (noting some of the economic and social classes effected by direct democracy). At
one point he expressed apparent astonishment at the holding in James v. Valtierra, since as he saw it that
case involved "de jure discrimination" against the poor. See id. at 162. That case involved a challenge to
a California initiative that required local governments to obtain voter approval before building low-
income housing projects. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 138-39 (1971). At another point, Ely
addressed the argument that the Warren Court's reapportionment decisions were ill-conceived to the
extent they struck down state laws that resulted from direct democracy. ELY, supra note 64, at 120-25.
In those situations, he posited that at least one of the decisions was "especially wrong because the
malapportionment had been approved 'by a substantial majority of the voters' in a popular referendum."
Id. at 239 n.60 (quoting ALEXANDER M. BIcKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS 110 (1970)). Ely commented that "[t]he argument sounds plausible at first, but is off the
mark." Id. He continued that the "reasons for judicial intervention are just as compelling when, say, 65
percent of the voters vote themselves 80 percent of the effective legislative power as when the
representatives of 40 percent of the voters secure for themselves 55 percent of the effective power." Id. I
read him here to say that malapportionment is unconstitutional, under process theory, no matter how it
comes about. That is, for Ely, direct democracy is not insulated from judicial review, but neither is it
automatically called out for hard look review.
6 Eule, supra note 12, at 1514-18. He concedes, however, that most ballot measures that pass are
relatively accurate reflections of the desires of those that actually vote on them. Id. at 1518.
17 Id. at 1520-22.
61 Id. at 1551.
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.rights."69 Nonetheless, he concluded that the filtering and deliberative process of
most of the legislative process will typically lead to a better result for minority
groups, as compared to a plebiscite.7"
For these reasons, Eule argued that the products of direct democracy should be
subject to a "hard judicial look" when subject to constitutional challenge. "
Borrowing the paradigm of Carolene Products and Professor Ely, this harder look
seemed necessary when the structure of government (i.e., direct democracy) lead to
less representation of all of the people.72 Eule was less clear on what the harder look
would consist of, and declined to "provide a detailed primer" for such "intensified
review." 73 He suggested that the usual "presumption of constitutionality should be
relaxed" and that the standards of substantive review might be modified. 74 For
example, Eule suggested that for a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause to
a ballot measure, the requirement that a discriminatory purpose must be shown
could be replaced with a mere showing of discriminatory impact.75 Of the vast array
of ballot measures, which should be subject to a harder look? For one, Eule argued
it would be appropriate when individual rights are at issue. In contrast, ballot
measures that "improve the processes of legislative representation . . . or reform
campaign finance practices pose no distinctive threat of majoritarian tyranny" and
thus should not be subject to a harder look.76
Eule's article remains the gold standard for proponents of harder judicial review
of ballot measures. 77 The literature opposing a harder judicial look in these
circumstances is modest in number. A leading example is by Professor Lynn Baker,
published shortly after Eule's article. 78 Baker revisited the issue of the rigor of
judicial review of ballot measures through the lens of public choice theory.79 She (as
69 Id. at 1551-53. He added that "the task of comparison seems Herculean. Plebiscites number in the
thousands annually. Legislative product no doubt can be counted in the millions. . . . Finally, the
passage of every ballot measure is influenced by a myriad of factors, and broad -based comparisons run
the risk of papering over these complexities." Id. at 1552 n.214.
70 Id at 1555-58.
1 Id. at 1558.
12 id. at 1558-59.
73 Id. at 1559.
74 Id. at 1558-59.
71 Seeid. at 1561-62.
76 Id. at 1559-60 (footnote omitted). However, Eule stated that "group alterations of government
structure and reapportionment efforts" should not be placed in the "category of governmental reform"
since these "reforms" are often a "facade for disfranchising minorities." Id. at 1560. Fiscal measures "like
taxation and spending limitations" might also be subject to harder look review, given that the brunt of
such measures are "borne by the underrepresented poor and by racial minorities." Id
77 According to Google Scholar, it has been cited over five hundred times by scholars and by courts.
GOOGLE SCHOLAR,
https'//scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&q=Eule+Judicial+Review+of+Direct+Democracy&btnG =&as
_sdt=1%2C18&as sdtp= (last visited Aug. 31, 2016).
78 SeegenerallyBaker, supra note 60.
79 Id. at 710.
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does much of the literature) focused on the effect of direct democracy on racial
minorities, because "the persistence of racial prejudice and of the correlation
between race and poverty in our society may make those interest groups unusually
vulnerable to majoritarian oppression and unusually incapable of capturing
lawmaking processes."" She first argued that there are overlooked differences in the
legislative and direct democracy processes as it concerns minorities. 81 It may be
difficult for minorities, by sheer numbers, to block disadvantageous enactments in
the latter, but by the same token motivated minorities may find it easier to pass
advantageous (or block harmful) legislation in the former. 2 Public choice theory
posits that the legislative process is subject to numerous infirmities that make it
difficult for a legislature to truly express majority preferences."' Baker argues that
the purported advantages of the legislative process in this regard are overstated,
since no one can "conclude a priori that the decisions of legislatures will more often
than those of plebiscites reflect consensus-building through conversation rather
than the mere aggregation of bargained-over preferences."'
Not surprisingly, Baker questions the efficacy of hard look judicial review as
well. First, she argues that it is doubtful that courts, in equal protection challenges,
will find it more difficult to identify unconstitutionally discriminatory conduct
emerging from a plebiscite as compared to a legislature.8" She doubts that either
drafters of initiatives or of legislation will couch their proposals in racially explicit
terms, and discerning the intent of a mass of voters can be just as difficult (as
students of statutory interpretation know) as discovering the intent of a large
legislative body.' More than that, Baker argues that the Supreme Court on several
occasions has found the products of direct democracy to be the result of
unconstitutional discrimination. 7 For these reasons, Baker concludes that a
different standard of review is not called for.88
0 Id.
11 Id. at 713.
12 Id. at 713.
' See id. at 715-52 (discussing at length the effect of characteristics of the legislative process
(bicameralism, the executive veto, logrolling opportunities, agenda control, open voting, and capacity for
deliberation), which are almost always absent from direct democracy); see also Eule, supra note 12, at
1549-51 (acknowledging these problems but not probing them in depth).
'4 Baker, supra note 60, at 737.
u1 Id. at 758-59.
" Id. She also argues that state legislative bodies may not produce a useful record on each piece of
legislation, as compared to the information available about the purpose of any given plebiscite. Id at
759.
" Id. at 759-62 (discussing Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982)). In general,
she argues that the intent requirement has not proven to be an insurmountable barrier to legal challenges
to legislation under the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 763-66.
11 See id at 771-72.
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II. A REAPPRAISAL: WHY JUSTICE THOMAS IS CORRECT
Professors Eule and Baker ably represented the two sides of the arguments on
whether courts should engage in more intrusive review of the products of direct
democracy as compared to that of legislatures. But they wrote a quarter of a century
ago, and a reappraisal of the debate is warranted in light of Justice Thomas's
comments in the Arizona State Legislature decision, the experience of direct
democracy, and the contributions of the scholarly literature since that time. This
section of the Article undertakes that task. It first focuses on the process of direct
democracy, particularly on the campaigns for passage of ballot measures and how
those measures reached the ballot in the first instance. It next considers the
products of direct democracy, and examines the topics of the scores of state-wide
ballot measures each year compared to legislation typically produced each year. The
Article then reexamines the proposals for hard judicial looks at ballot measures.
The section concludes with a hard look at Justice Black's apparent position that
more, not less, judicial deference should come into play when courts consider
constitutional challenges to ballot measures.
A. The Process ofDirect Democracy
If carried on at a high level of generality, the debate over the proper scope of
judicial review of ballot measures might suggest that such measures are hermetically
sealed, in their creation and possible passage, from other elements of the political
system. But a more nuanced analysis of such measures reveals that generalizations
must be made with care. Such measures are often the result of complex interplay
with political parties, interest groups, and the other branches of state government.
That is, all these players might, at various times, alternatively support or oppose
[Vol. 104
Judicial Review of Direct Democracy
ballot measures as one of many options to pursue policy goals.89 Consider that
referenda are typically placed on the ballot by the legislature, or that there are many
examples of ballot measures being pursued multiple times after being first
rejected.9" In other words, measures do not spontaneously appear on the ballot, but
rather are often the result of a complex, iterative process among many interested
parties, not unlike the complexity of the (admittedly different) development of
policy in the legislative or executive branches. One should not generalize this too
much; some ballot measures might be regarded as one-shot efforts supported
fiscally or otherwise by one or a small number of interest groups. But the supporters
of a hard look review typically paint with a broad brush regarding all, or a
significant subset of, ballot measures.
Supporters of a hard look review also point to the apparent pathologies of the
campaigns for, and the knowledge (or lack thereof) of the voters on, ballot
measures. It cannot be denied that ample evidence and studies continue to support
the criticisms of voting on such measures outlined by Eule and others.9 Many
voters do not even vote for ballot measures, and those that do are often hampered
by confusion and ignorance about such measures.9 2 For example, some studies show
that campaigns for direct democracy can differ from those for candidates, in that
voters in the latter often rely on cues like partisanship or incumbency when they
make decisions on candidates, while those in the former rely more directly on the
' Cf Frederick J. Boehmke et al., Pivotal Politics and Initiative Use in the American States, 68 POL.
RES. Q. 665, 675 (2015) (detailing a broad study of initiative use in twenty-four states over time that
highlights "the interdependence of political institutions," and finding that the "initiative process can
break the traditional legislative gridlock" and "[p]olicies that formerly would have been gridlocked can
now be moved, either through legislative preemption or through the ballot box"); Shaun Bowler, When
Is it OK to Limit Direct Democracy?, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1780, 1789-91 (2013) (giving examples of
how legislators use referenda to advance their policy interests); David F. Damore & Stephen P.
Nicholson, Mobilizing Interests: Group Participation and Competition in Direct Democracy Elections,
36 POL. BEHAV. 535, 549 (2014) (detailing a study of initiatives and referenda from 2003 to 2008 on
social and tax issues shows that they are likely to produce competition among interest groups, and that
groups use direct democracy elections to "advance political goals such as shaping the composition of the
broader electorate or setting the agenda in candidate races"); Vladimir Kogan, When Voters Pull the
Triger: Can Direct Democracy Restrain Legislative Excesses?, 41 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 297 (201.6) (using
Ohio as a case study, exploring how rejection by referendum of a controversial law passed by the state
legislature subsequently induced moderation by the legislative majority); John G. Matsusaka,
Disentangling the Direct and Indirect Effects of the Initiative Process, 160 PUB. CHOICE 345 (2014)
(exploring how both successful initiatives and the threats of such measures have effects on public policy
in the states). The interactions can even be said to include the federal government. See generally
Kathleen Ferraiolo, State Policy Innovation and the Federalism Implications of Direct Democracy, 38
PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 488 (2008) (detailing a study of state ballot measures that are responses to
federal action or inaction).
0 See Corey A. Johanningmeier, Note, Law & Politics: The Case Against Judicial Review of Direct
Democracy, 82 IND. L.J. 1125, 1131-33 (2007).
91 See supra note 66 and accompanying text; see also Hofer, supra note 60, at 57-59.
9' See Bowler, supra note 89, at 1783.
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(typically) single issue presented in the ballot measure. 93 Other studies have found
these characteristics particularly acute for direct democracy proposals that affect
minority rights. These proposals can present the opportunity for a "populist
backlash" against the "counter-majoritarian aspects of democracy that are facilitated
by courts and representative government."94 In turn, "compared to other measures
that reach the ballot, direct-democracy campaigns offer more room for voting on
rights questions to be based on animus, negative group affect, negative stereotypes
about the targeted group, and animus toward general counter-majoritarian
elements of democracy." 5 The mostly successful campaigns in the past fifteen years
to pass ballot measures to ban same-sex marriage are often attributed to such
decision-making by voters.96
Here, too, the story is more complex and nuanced. Other political scientists, in
canvassing the literature and studies, argue that some of the criticism of voters in
direct democracy is overstated in that "a large body of empirical work shows that
voters can, by and large, align their votes on a measure with a perception of their
own interests or ideologies."97 There is, alas, ample evidence that most Americans
in general, and voters in particular, have little information on many issues, large
and small, concerning political issues and campaigns of all sorts.9" Based on this
evidence, it seems unjustified to carve out voting behavior on ballot measures as
some anomaly in American politics deserving of special judicial treatment. Indeed,
the evidence, such as it is, can be characterized as showing that voters on ballot
measures (those that actually vote) are in some ways more focused and informed
about the issue at hand than the typical voter on other matters on the ballot. 99
More focused decision-making by such voters may be troubling to critics of direct
democracy, but it essentially restates the normative issue of whether courts should
93 See Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy and Campaigns Against Minorities, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1730,
1732-37 (2013)."4 -d. at 1743.
95 Id. (footnote omitted).
9 See id. at 1746-72.
97 Bowler, supra note 89, at 1785.
9s For overviews of the evidence, see generally BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL
VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES (2007); ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND
POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER (2013).
99 One reason voters in direct democracy are more focused is due to the "single subject" rule of most
states, which limits initiatives to one "subject." Cooter & Gilbert, supra note 26, at 689. "The primary
purpose of the rule is to eliminate logrolling-the combining of multiple measures, none of which
would pass on its own, into an omnibus proposition that receives majority support," and it seems to have
the effect of making it easier (perhaps too easy, in the minds of some critics) for typical voters to decide
how to cast their ballot on such measures. Id. That said, perhaps a better comparison is between the
behavior of voters as a whole, and the behavior of their representatives in state legislatures. Both
supporters and critics of hard look review acknowledge, to varying degrees, state legislatures are subject
to institutional pathologies that limit their ability to directly represent the views of constituents or enact
(or defeat) legislation reflecting those views. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; see also Jeffrey
R. Lax &Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 148 (2012).
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be especially concerned by the existence (and products) of direct democracy in the
first instance.
B. The Products ofDirect Democracy
The recent commentary on direct democracy has focused on ballot measures
that arguably restrict minority rights, a subject to which I will turn momentarily.
But that focus obscures the wide variety of issues that are the subject of initiatives
and referenda. Kenneth Miller has cataloged initiatives into "seven broad policy
areas:" political and government reform; health, welfare, and morals; economic
regulation; environment; tax; criminal procedure and punishment; and education. 1"
The numbers and types of the measures adopted vary from state to state, but over
time the largest number has been for political and governmental reform, with the
others trailing behind.1 °' Most of the recent controversial measures impacting
minority or individual rights would be grouped under the "health, welfare, and
morals" category. 102 Similarly, data from 2000-2009 shows that only small
percentages of adopted initiatives cover what would be by most accounts"
controversial issues of rights.'0 3
Many discussions of direct democracy and controversial social issues rely on
relatively narrow examples of ballot measures that impose the death penalty, limit
affirmative action, or otherwise lead to results on the conservative side of the
spectrum. 104 In contrast, in recent years one could cite to examples on the
progressive side of ballot measures passing that legalize marijuana use, raise the
minimum wage, or legalize same-sex marriage.0 5 These anecdotal accounts are
useful, but if federal courts are to take the significant step of imposing hard look
review on all initiatives and referenda-or important subsets of them-then a
broader view of direct democracy is called for.
100 MILLER, supra note 22, at 55.
101 Id. at 56 tbl2.2 (relaying data from 1904-2008, showing a total of 919 initiatives adopted: 339 under
political and government reform; 150 under health, welfare, and morals; 147 under economic regulation;
80 under environment; 106 under tax; 36 under criminal procedure and punishment; and 61 under
education).
102 Id. at 59-60.
103 Donovan, supra note 14, at 28 fig.2 (showing only 8.5% of popular initiatives from 2000-09
concerned "civil, constitutional matters").
1' See, e.g., John Dinan, Pobcy Provisions in State Constitutions: The Standards and Practice of State
Constitution-Making in the Post-Baker v. Carr Era, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 155, 190, 195-96 (2014).
" Liz Essley Whyte, How Democratic Are Ballot Initiatives?, ATLANTIC: POL. & POL'Y (an. 6,
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/baRot-initiatives-2016/422385/ (giving
examples of state ballot measures expected to be advanced by liberal interest groups in 2016); see also
Dinan, supra note 104, at 189-91; Julie Bosman, Petition Drive in Nebraska Forces Vote on Abolshing
Death Penal,4 N.Y. TIMES Oct. 17, 2015, at A12 (describing a petition drive that reestablished the
death penalty); Ben Brumfield, Voters Approve Same-Sex Marriage For the Errst Time, CNN: POL.
(Nov. 7, 2012,2:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/politics/pol-same-sex-marriage/.
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For a finer-grained look at coverage and results of direct democracy, consider
data from the past two years (examining any one year might be misleading since
there are typically fewer ballot measures in off-year elections). In all of 2014, there
were 159 ballot measures in the states; about two-thirds passed.'a6 The subject
matters of measures that passed ranged from higher minimum wages, to marijuana
legalization, to the right to hunt.10 7 There were relatively few measures that would
be said to implicate minority or individual rights, the primary focus of the debate
revisited in this Article. Of those few examples, Colorado and North Dakota
rejected "personhood" amendments, which would have given legal status to the
unborn and considerably limited abortion rights." 8 On the other hand, two states
(Connecticut and Missouri) rejected efforts to adopt early voting, Montana rejected
an effort to repeal same-day voter registration, and Oregon refused to adopt the"top two" primary system, in which all political party candidates would run in the
same primary.'0 9
In contrast, in 2015 there were twenty-eight ballot measures, twenty of which
were approved."0 There were none that can be said to directly implicate individual
rights. However, Ohio adopted a measure to require a bipartisan commission to
draw state legislative districts, while Maine adopted a measure to increase public
funding for political campaigns."' The most prominent measure rejected was in
Ohio, concerning an effort to legalize marijuana." 2
This small slice of the recent history of ballot measures shows that while most
pass, the vast majority are noncontroversial and rarely implicate the sort of issues
that are the bte noire of the critics of direct democracy. Whether controversial or
not, voters do not reflexively adopt (or for that matter, reject) these measures.
Indeed, voters in two conservative states rejected measures in 2014 that would have
1"See Ballot Measures Database, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, www.ncsl.org/research/elections-
and-campaigns/ballot-measures-database.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2016) (select all states, all topics, all
measure types, all elections, and 2014). This database breaks ballot measures into four categories:
legislative referendum; initiative; popular referendum; and other. See id. Similar databases and
information are found at www.ballotpedia.org and www.iandrinstitute.org.
107 Wendy Underhill, Ballot Measures: Yes on Wages and Weed, No on GMOS and Voting, NAT'L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES: NCSL BLOG- (Nov. 5, 2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2014/11/05/baU6t-measures-yes-on-wages-and-weed-no-on-gmos-and-
voting.aspx.
10 Id.
101 See id.
"0 Ballot Measures Database, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/ballot-measures-database.aspx (last visited Sept. 2, 2016) (select all states, all topics, all
measure types, all elections, and 2015).
... Wendy Underhill, Voters Give Thumbs Up to Most Ballot Measures, NAT'L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES: NCSL BLOG (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2015/11/04/voters-give-
thumbs-up-to-most-baUot-measures.aspx (focusing on fall 2015 elections).
11 Id.
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virtually outlawed abortion under most if not all circumstances.' 13 Still, these are
only two years, and we can draw on more comprehensive studies of the adoption or
rejection of measures concerning individual rights. Some studies of direct
democracy and minority rights did seem to show that measures limiting those
rights were adopted at a relatively high rate.'14 Other studies suggest that these
results have been overstated.1 5 But the principal limitation of all of these studies is
the failure to compare it to the record of state legislatures, a problem anticipated by
Eule." 6 Recent work by Daniel C. Lewis has begun to fill that gap. Lewis has
studied what he calls anti-minority policies by comparing states that have, and do
not have, direct democracy from 1995 to 2004.117 He examines three proposals:
those that involved homosexual rights, promoted English proficiency, or limited
affirmative action programs, which, he said, "encompass nearly all the anti-
minority policies considered during this period.""' He found that such proposals
pass at double the rate in states that have direct democracy as compared to those
that do not.'19 But the overall passage rates were modest: those for the former were
about 20%, and those in the latter were less than 10%.20
113 Jennifer Ludden, Two of Three States Reject Ballot Measures Restricting Abortion, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/11/07/362327684/two-of-three-states-reject-ballot-
measures-restricting-abortion#.
114 See, e.g., Barbara S. Gamble, Putting CivilRights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM.J. POL. SCI. 245 (1997)
(studying state and local measures between 1960 and 1993 regarding AIDs testing, gay rights, language,
school desegregation, and housing/public accommodations); Sylvia R Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of
Initiatives and Referendums in which Majorities Vote on Minorities'Democratic Citizenship, 60 OHIO
ST. L.J. 399, 409 (1999) (studying state-wide and local ballot measures from 1960 to 1998 regarding
limits on minority rights and showing a passage rate of over 80%). The problems with these and similar
studies is the contested definition of what counts as a minority right, which I further address in Part
II.C., and the inclusion of all ballot measures, both local and state-wide. The discrepancy mentioned in
the text might even be higher if states with direct democracy also are less likely to legislatively pass
measures to protect minorities. On the other hand, states with direct democracy might be less politically
friendly to minorities anyway, meaning that they might pass anti-minority laws regardless of the
presence of direct democracy mechanisms. So, we cannot always be sure that the availability of such
mechanisms in the states is the cause of anti-minority measures; the direction of causation arrows can be
difficult to sort out. Cf Daniel C. Lewis, Bypassing the Representational Flter? Minority Rights
Policies Under Direct Democracy Democratic Institutions in the US. States, 11 ST. POL. &POL'Y Q.
198, 209 (2011) (noting that "a myriad of factors can influence whether a single policy is ultimately
adopted by the state.").
115 See, e.g., Zoltan L. Hajnal, et al., Minorities and Direct Legislation: Evidence from California Ballot
Proposition Elections, 64 J. POL. 154, 156 (2002); see also Dinan, supra note 14, at 88-93 (discussing
initiatives for amendments to state constitutions that impair minority rights from 2000 to 2014 and
concluding that the record does not offer strong support for the assertion that rights have been
negatively impacted).
116 See supra note 69 and accompanying text; Eule, supra note 12, at 1551-52.
117 Lewis, supra note 114, at 203.
11 Id. The ballot proposals he studied were only those citizen proposals that qualified for the ballot. Id.
at 218 n.7.
Id. at 204.Id. at 204-05, tbl.2.
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Lewis's study does indeed show that states without direct democracy have a
better record regarding minority provisions as compared to those that do. But the
passage rates are surprisingly modest overall, especially as compared to prior
studies. Perhaps this is due to Lewis restricting the proposals examined to the three
categories and only those that were state-wide. A fuller comparative picture might
examine the fate of other types of issues (like those, as suggested by Eule, that
improve the political process), and how the ballot measures that passed were
applied on the ground (or even modified or repealed by later action, including by
the courts).121 Even so, his study should give those critical of the hard look judicial
review some pause. But in my view, that pause does not lead to the conclusion that
the difference between ballot measures and legislative action is so great that the
scope of judicial review should be impacted.
C. Revisiting Hard LookJudicial Review
Even Julian Eule, the most articulate proponent of the hard look judicial review
of (some) ballot measures, expressed uncertainty about when the hard look should
take place and what it should look like. 22 I believe he was right to be reticent.
Here, I assume that some measures might be subject to a harder look, but revisit
the parameters of that harder review.
First is the issue of what ballot measures should be subject to that review. Recall
that Eule acknowledged that ballot measures can impact and limit a variety of
federal constitutional rights, but argued that a harder judicial look should be
reserved only for those measures that implicate "individual rights and equal
application" of the laws. 3 On the other hand, a different approach should be taken
for those measures "[w]here . . . the electorate acts to improve the processes of
legislative representation, [as] the justification for judicial vigilance is absent." t24
However, from this second category he would exclude "group alterations of
government structure and reapportionment efforts" or taxpayer revolt measures,
since they can be "facade[s] for disfranchising minorities" and are "borne by the
underrepresented poor and by racial minorities" respectively.12 5
These inclusions and exclusions raise a number of difficult questions that courts
would need to answer if they were to embrace the hard look theory. Consider the
categories outlined by Eule. Those laws affecting individual rights seem easy
121 For an overview of the last point, albeit not one focusing on judicial invalidation of anti-minority
ballot measures, see MILLER, supra note 22, at 104-17.
12 See Eule, supra note 12, at 1559.
12 See id.
124 Id. He gave as an example "[mieasures to enforce ethics in government, regulate lobbyists, or reform
campaign finance practices." Id. at 1559-60 (footnotes omitted).
12 Id. at 1560. See generally Nathaniel Persily & Melissa Cully Anderson, Regulating Democracy
Through Democracy- The Use of Direct Lepglation in Election Law Reform, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 997,
1030-32 (2005).
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enough to identify. For example, the same-sex marriage bans (many the result of
ballot measures) invalidated by Obergefefl limited the rights of gays. 126 Other
examples may be more difficult to classify. Consider the much discussed decision of
Citizens United v. FEC, where a 5-4 majority invalidated, on First Amendment
grounds, a federal law that limited the ability of corporations and labor unions to
make independent expenditures in campaigns for federal office. 127 Is that law (or a
similar state ballot measure) one that limits free speech rights, or does it fall into
the campaign finance reform category?
Classifying ballot measures that implicate minority rights or the Equal
Protection Clause can also prove difficult. Anti-affirmative action measures might
seem easy to classify to some, but even this implicates a debate over the political
process theory, as we have seen. 121 What groups qualify as "discrete and insular
minorities" in the Carolene Products sense has also come to be contested.129 How
exactly to identify and measure the purported "political powerlessness" of certain
minorities has not been clarified by the Supreme Court, and has been subject to any
kind of consensus by scholars.13
Finally, consider the "government structure" category. Here, Eule refers to state
legislative malapportionment schemes (successfully challenged in federal courts in
the 1960s), some of which were enacted through ballot measures. " Yet this
category would also seem to cover initiatives, like Ohio's in 2015, that require
legislative apportionment to be done by a bipartisan commission, rather than on a
partisan basis by the legislature itself.3 2 Such initiatives have been much lauded on
political process grounds since they replace legislatures that often draw districts to
preserve incumbency or partisan advantages. ' However, some commissions
126 See Marriage and Family on the Ballot, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://baflotpedia.org/Marriage-and-family-on the ballot (last visited Sept. 1, 2016).
127 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
"' See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text; see also Persily & Anderson, supra note 123, at 999
(discussing how certain types of election reforms, such as term limits, are more prevalent in initiative
states).
29 See, e.g., Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History ofthe Carolene Products Footnote,
46 S. TEx. L. REv. 163,218 (2004).
130 See Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, PolticalPowerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527, 1530 (2015).
131 Eule, supra note 12, at 1560 n.255 (referring to, inter alia, Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly,
377 U.S. 713 (1964)). It is worth noting that prior to the reapportionment revolution in the Supreme
Court in the early 1960s the public voted on initiatives that would have reapportioned legislatures to
reflect population changes in at least nine states. Jonathan Woon, Direct Democracy and the Selection
of Representative Institutions: Voter Support for Apportionment Initiatives, 1924-62, 7 ST. POL. &
POL'Y Q. 167, 171, 184 n.7 (2007).
132 Ohio Bipartisan Redistricting Commission Amendment, Issue 1, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ba otpedia.org/Ohio-Bipartisan Redistricting-Commission-Amendment,-Issue-1-(2015) (last
visited Sept. 2, 2016).
133 Stephanopoulos, Arizona andAnti-Reform, supra note 65, at 489-91.
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themselves have been accused of acting in partisan ways. 1 34 Similarly, the passage of
term limits in many states by ballot measures has been a matter of controversy
regarding whether they advance or hinder the goals of government reform. 131
The point here is that classifying the ballot measures subject to harder look
review is fraught with difficult empirical and normative questions. True enough,
courts confront these questions in other areas of public law, but that does not mean
they are any less difficult for the topic at hand. I would let courts confront these
issues when considering the nature of the constitutional challenge to any law,
whether the result of direct democracy or not, and let the chips fall as they may. It
seems superfluous to engage in yet another inquiry to determine if the challenge to
a ballot measure deserves yet a different layer of scrutiny. 136
If there was an extra layer of scrutiny to resolve the proper level of review for
ballot measures, we could anticipate courts confronting a series of second-order
issues that could make the inquiry even more complicated. For example, what
weight, if any, should a court give to a measure passing by a large majority, as
opposed to just scraping by? What if the measure was preceded by defeats of the
same or similar measure? What about the somewhat different methods of adoption
in the states that have direct democracy? What weight, if any, should be given to
the fact that the same or similar measures were passed in other states? 37 Answering
13 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2691-92 (2015)
(Roberts, J., dissenting) (discussing the partisan behavior of Arizona's Commission). For an overview of
the operation of these commissions, see Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political
Bufler?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808, 1812-20 (2012).
135 See MICHAEL DIMINO, ET AL., VOTING RIGHTS AND ELECTION LAW 549-50 (2d ed. 2015)
(discussing arguments for and against term limits).
136 It could be argued that some of these problems might be ameliorated if hard-look review was limited
to fewer or narrower categories that those outlined by Eule. For example, such review could be confined
to initiatives that limit the rights of minority groups. This would blunt some of my criticisms of the
Eule categories, but there would still be the problem of identifying minority rights in this context. See
supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text. Even when so limited, I would still conclude that hard-
look review of direct democracy is not, on balance, justified for all of the reasons I outline.
137 The last question is raised by the Ober~gfell and US. Term Limits decisions. See Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015); U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 870 (1995). For
more information on this question, see Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. Ci. L. REV. 929,
940 (2014); Matthew E. K. Hall & Ryan C. Black, Keeping the Outliers in Line?Judicial Review of
State Laws by the US. Supreme Court, 94 SOC. SO. Q. 395, 396, 406 (2013). However, neither article
directly addresses state laws enacted via direct democracy.
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these questions might require an initiative-by-initiative review rather than courts
reviewing all products of direct democracy in the same way."'
This brings me to the scope of the proposed harder look review itself.
Presumably, it would be akin to the sort of strict scrutiny found in other areas of
constitutional law, 139 or the "hard look" doctrine of administrative law.1" Eule also
suggested that the harder look might involve reversing the usual presumption of the
constitutionality of legislation, or (at least in Equal Protection challenges) only
requiring that discriminatory impact, rather than purpose, be shown. 141 Eule
alternatively suggested that the burden of proving discriminatory motive could be
relaxed, rather than abandoned, by making it easier to prove such motive in this
context by relying on evidence from the campaign for or against the ballot measure
in question.142
These seem to be reasonable measures for an advocate of a hard look review,
but I wonder how or why courts would adopt them. Courts have shown relatively
little reticence in ruling on the constitutionality of ballot measures under the
normal rules of review. Consider that since Eule wrote, the Court has ruled on the
13s The advantage of a case-by-case approach is that it might ameliorate the criticisms of the hard -look
review advanced here, since the hard-look review would presumably only apply to a subset of cases. The
disadvantage to the approach is that it would likely increase the complexity of the judicial inquiry by
requiring an intensive examination of the factors listed in the text. A case-by-case approach is suggested
in Steve Sanders, Mini-DOM~s as Political Process Failures: The Case for Heightened Scrutiny of
State Anti-Gay Marriage Amendments, 109 Nw. U. L. REV. ONLINE 12, 15 (2014). The author
concludes that all state ballot measures that banned same-sex marriage should be subject to a hard-look
review because "[b]y strong-arming marriage discrimination into state constitutions-which typically are
far more difficult to change than ordinary statutes-during a relatively brief period from 1998 to 2012,
mini-DOMA proponents intended to freeze marriage discrimination in place and put it beyond the
reach of ordinary democratic deliberation." 1d. at 14. The implication of this is that Sanders would not
sfsbject allballot measures to hard-look review. That said, Sanders essentially considered all of the same-
sex ballot measures en masse, and not on a strict state-by-state basis.
1"9 See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227-28 (2015); McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 1445 (2014); see also Richard H. Fallon. Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267,
1268-75 (2007).
" Thomas W. Merrill, Presidential Administration and the Traditions of Administrative Law, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1967 (2015); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of
Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHi. L. REV. 761, 761-63 (2008); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,41-44 (1983).
141 See Eule, supra note 12, at 1558-59, 1561-62.
142 See id. at 1562. Similar arguments have been advanced reading the interpretation of ballot measures
in litigation other than constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular
Intent" Interpretative Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 109 (1995); see also D.
Zachary Hudson, Comment, Interpreting the Products of Direct Democracy, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 223,223-24 (2009). But seeMichael D. Gilbert, Interpreting Initiatives, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1621,
1623 (2013) (arguing that "judges should interpret initiatives consistent with the preferences of the
median voter"); Michael M. O'Hear, Statutory Interpretation and Direct Democracy: Lessons from the
Drug Treatment Initiatives, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 322-37 (2003) (arguing that differences
between ballot measures and legislation have been overstated, and ordinary methods of statutory
interpretation should apply to both).
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merits of at least eleven constitutional challenges to state law that resulted from
ballot measures." Granted, the Court and individual Justices have been unclear
and mostly silent on the issue raised by this Article, as highlighted by Justice
Thomas at the end of the 2014-15 Term. However, in those eleven cases, a
majority of the Court struck down the laws in six instances.'" It would seem that
the ordinary tools of constitutional inquiry sufficed for the Justices.
It appears that in these decisions there was virtually no direct discussion of the
motives of the voters in passing these ballot measures. Both Eule and Baker
addressed what a hard look review might look like for Equal Protection challenges,
and it is instructive to consider what the Court has done in that regard since they
wrote. In one decision that presented an unsuccessful Equal Protection challenge,
Schuette v. BAMN, none of the opinions addressed the motives of the voters
except in the most oblique ways, or referenced the sort of interpretative sources
suggested by Eule.14 Similarly, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court considered both
Due Process and Equal Protection challenges to four same-sex marriage bans."
However, with respect to either challenge, neither the majority opinion, holding
that the bans violated both Clauses, nor any of the four dissents, engaged in any
discussion of, or discussed any evidence about, the motives of the voters who passed
the ballot measures in question. In short, in these and the other recent cases
involving constitutional challenges to ballot measures, under any Clause of the
Constitution, a hard look review, despite the fears of Eule and others, has proven
to be unnecessary.
D. Was Justice Black Wrong?
No discussion of judicial deference in this context would be complete without a
consideration of Justice Black's views. So far I have argued that a hard judicial look
at ballot measures under constitutional challenge is unwarranted. Do those
arguments also lead to the conclusion that more (or even total?) judicial deference
is warranted? As noted above,147 opinions by Justice Black, and later at least one by
Justice Thomas, have led some observers to conclude that these Justices were
143 See supra note 37 & accompanying text.
144 See supra note 37 & accompanying text.
145 Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). Indeed, Justice Sotomayor thought it unnecessary to
address any possible "racial animus" by the voters, since the political process doctrine "operates
irrespective of discriminatory intent, for it protects a process-based right." Id. at 1663 n.8 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
'4' Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).
147 See supra Part I.B.
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discarding even rational basis review and would seemingly reject constitutional
challenges to ballot measures under all, or virtually all, circumstances. 4 '
A careful reading of the opinions in question by these Justices suggests that they
were not calling for a hyper-deferential review of ballot measures. For example, in
James v. Valtierra, the Court considered a challenge under (among other things)
the Equal Protection Clause to a provision of the California Constitution, adopted
by initiative, that required any low-rent housing project must be approved by the
voters of the town or county in question.'49 Writing for the majority and upholding
the provision, Justice Black referred in glowing terms to direct democracy. In
California, he said, referenda had been frequently used "to give citizens a voice on
questions of public policy .... [They] demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to
bias, discrimination, or prejudice."5 °
But that was not his sole point. Elsewhere in the opinion, he distinguished
Vatierra from an earlier Court decision in the political process line of cases, in that
the California referendum was not based on racial distinctions, only income."' He
added that "the record here would not support any claim that a law seemingly
neutral on its face is in fact aimed at a racial minority."152 He further observed that
California law requires local referenda for mundane items like the issuance of long-
term bonds or land acquisition, so if the plaintiffs here prevailed, it might lead to
the absurd proposition that all such referenda violate the Equal Protection
Clause.'53 Justice Black did not specifically mention the standard of review, and one
reading of that might be that he was virtually abdicating any judicial review. But a
better reading is that he was using rational basis scrutiny, albeit one without bite,
given the origin of the provision under challenge.
A similar conclusion is suggested by Justice Thomas's dissent in U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.114 Recall that he mentioned several times the initiative in
Nebraska and elsewhere that had resulted in term limits for members of Congress
148 See, e.g, Bell, supra note 36, at 4-7 (commenting on Justice Black's opinions on this subject); Eule,
supra note 12, at 1506 (commenting on Justice Black's opinions on this subject). As a corollary of such
deference, some federal judges have seemed to suggest that state legislation should be more readily
upheld when a ballot measure to overturn it has failed. See Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen
v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 393 U.S. 130, 136 (1968) (Black, J.). Other judges have
suggested that federal constitutional rights should not be recognized when a ballot measure that would
have established such a right as a matter of state law failed. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington,
85 F.3d 1440, 1446 (9th Cit. 1996) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
149 James v. Valtiera, 402 U.S. 137, 139 (1971).
I. at 141.
5 Id. at 140-41 (distinguishing Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969)).
152 Id. at 141.
153 See id. at 142-43. Three Justices dissented on the basis that the provision discriminated on the basis
of income and therefore strict judicial scrutiny was warranted. id. at 143-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The force of the dissent's position has been undermined by later decisions, which have held that those
with low incomes do not form a suspect class, so strict scrutiny is not required. See, e.g., San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973).
154 SeeU.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845, 925-26 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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and for other elected officials.' However, this was hardly the focal point ofJustice
Thomas's analysis. Over the course of a lengthy dissent, he closely analyzed the text
and history of the relevant provisions, discussed judicial precedent, and responded
to the arguments of the majority.16 Like Justice Black in Valtierra, Justice Thomas
did not specifically dwell on the standard of judicial review when he concluded the
state law was constitutional, but it is a far stretch to conclude that he was not
engaging in any review at all. At best, perhaps, he was giving a ballot measure the
benefit of the doubt, though he did not seem very doubtful about his conclusions in
the rest of the dissent.
But even if not embraced by Justices Black and Thomas, should there be total
abdication of judicial review (or something close to it) of ballot measures? No judge
or scholar, as far as I know, has advocated such a position,"5 7 and I think with good
reason. In my view, no provision of the U.S. Constitution, or of the history of the
drafting of the documents, induding the Reconstruction Amendments, or of some
federal (or state) judicial tradition, can be drafted in aid of such a position. 58 Of
course, this silence is not surprising, since direct democracy did not emerge among
the States until the end of the nineteenth century.'59 More broadly, a position of
complete judicial abdication would give too much weight to the counter-
majoritarian difficulty as the principal problem facing the exercise of judicial review
by federal courts. Aside from the fact that direct democracy itself faces some
problems in revealing the wishes of a majority (just like the legislative and executive
branches), the difficulty itself can be overstated as a foundational problem in
American jurisprudence.16 While I think judges and Justices should be aware of
the difficulty, it is best responded to by doctrines like a presumption of
constitutionality for state law, not complete abdication of their review by courts.1 6 '
115 See id. at 859-60, 862, 917; MILLER, supra note 22 at 161-62, 166.
156 See US Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 845-923 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
157 See, e.g, MILLER, supra note 22, at 89-91 (discussing limited support for some greater deference, as
compared to complete judicial abdication).
15' Not even the introductory words to the Constitution, "We the People." That phrase was drafted at a
time when direct democracy did not exist.
19 See Histor,, INST. FOR DIRECT DEMOCRACY, http:/idd-
bg.com/en/democracy/history/worldwide.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2016).
160 For an extensive discussion of the counter-majoritarian difficulty, inside and outside of the Supreme
Court, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
Friedman concludes that, on the whole, the Court has been a majoritarian institution, in most instances
following the majority view on various issues. See id. at 371-80. For a skeptical appraisal of that
position, see Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a "Majoritatian" Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT.
REv. 103.
161 A similar conclusion is suggested by a more formalist critique of the distinction between state
legislative action and the products of direct democracy. In both situations, the products have the force of
law and states do not make a distinction between the two when implementing those laws. It would seem
to follow that courts should not rank-order the two types of law when considering constitutional
challenges.
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CONCLUSION
Even while criticizing the products of direct democracy and calling for a harder
judicial look for at least some constitutional challenges to ballot measures, Julian
Eule, with his characteristic insight, wondered if he should be careful for what he
wished for. He observed:
Plebiscites serve as an escape valve for the frustrations of day-to-day encounters
with faceless, unresponsive, and oppressive bureaucracies. If courts afford this
spleen-venting little deference, and we block judicial accountability by placing the
dirty task of checking in the Federal court, will something have to give? Could it
take the form of diminished respect for and obedience to the courts, resentment
toward Washington by an increasingly alienated populace, or apathetic retreats
from civic responsibility?'62
Eule was probably overstating the downsides of hard look judicial review, but
his cautionary tale is worth pondering.
Ballot measures in the states show no sign of diminishing since their revival in
the past thirty years. They can and have been described as a form of "unorthodox
lawmaking"163 that might become increasingly characteristic of public policy in a
political environment, at both the federal and state level, which seems increasingly
fractured and polarized." Perhaps if direct democracy began to take an outsized
role in the creation of public policy and increasingly displaced the role of state
legislatures, the case for a harder judicial review might be better justified. Until
such time, I think Justice Thomas has it right that constitutional challenges to the
products of direct democracy in federal court should be subject to the same scrutiny
as legislative and executive action.
162 Eule, supra note 12, at 1585.
163 Abbe R. Gluck, et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
1789, 1823 (2015) (describing direct democracy as an example of unorthodox lawmaking).
'64 On the increasing polarization of American politics, see Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing
Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE LJ. 804,
808-818 (2014). For a prediction that both liberal and conservative forces will increasingly turn to state
ballot measures to advance policy goals, in part to respond to the other side, see Whyte, supra note 105.
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